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Abstract
In recent papers Matthew Rabin and Richard H. Thaler have argued that expected utility
theory generates implausible predictions about individuals' attitudes toward small vs. large
risks. Specifically, these authors argued that expected utility theory, plus the assertion that
individuals reject small risks that are actuarially unfavorable, implies that agents should
reject large risks which in fact they would accept. In this paper we question the presumption
that the small risks are in fact rejected: they have risk−return characteristics that are superior
to those of the daily returns on common stocks, which individuals generally find acceptable.
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utility theory generates implausible predictions about individuals’ attitudes toward
large vs. small risks.1 For example, they showed that if an agent rejects a 50-
50 gamble between losing $10 and winning $11, he will also reject a 50-50 gamble
between losing $100 and winning an inﬁnite amount of money. They asserted that,
from introspection, the small gamble would be rejected and the large gamble accepted.
The conclusion is that expected utility must be wrong.
Is it so obvious that the small risky prospect just described will be rejected?
Consider an agent who is just indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting the small
gamble at all levels of wealth. That agent has negative exponential utility U(x)=
−e−αx,w i t hα equal to the value that solves −e−αx =( −e−α(x+11) − e−α(x−10))/2,
which is the same for all x. Now imagine that the gamble is repeated 365 times–
once each day for a year. An agent with negative exponential utility will be indiﬀerent
between making the bet once, not at all, or every day, since past outcomes do not
aﬀect his risk aversion. Since the expected payoﬀ of the gamble played once is 0.5,
the expected payoﬀ of 365 independent repetitions is 365∗0.5=1 8 2 .5. Similarly, the
standard deviation of the gamble played once is 10.5, so its standard deviation played
365 times is 10.5 ∗
√
365 = 200.6. We have here an investment with a risk-return
tradeoﬀ that is considerably better than we see on the stock market.
Every day individuals maintain positions in risky portfolios that look less attrac-
tive than Rabin-Thaler’s win-11/lose-10 gamble.2 One concludes that, in terms of
what they actually do, individuals accept Rabin-Thaler’s gamble. This poses an
interesting research question: why do individuals reject in questionnaires and exper-
iments risky prospects that are more attractive than real-world prospects that they
accept every day? Whatever the explanation for this discrepancy between what
people do and what they say they do, there are no implications whatsoever here for
the validity or lack thereof of expected utility, at least insofar as the goal is to model
what agents actually do.3
1Richard Watt [5], Ariel Rubinstein [4] and Ignacio Palacios-Huerta, Roberto Serrano and Oscar
Volij [1] have also written criticisms of Rabin-Thaler. The last of these makes essentially the same
point as here.
2This argument invokes intuition from security markets, in which agents can optimize over the
number of shares held, in analyzing Rabin-Thaler’s example, in which agents’ choice is whether to
accept or reject a random prospect of a given size. There is no reason to think that this diﬀerence
invalidates our conclusion that individuals in fact accept random prospects that according to Rabin-
Thaler’s introspection, they say they reject.
3It may be objected that this example is unrealistic because of its dependence on the negative
exponential utility function. As seen above, that utility function is appropriate if we are to analyze
an agent who is indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting a random prospect of given absolute
magnitude at all levels of wealth.
The example can be recast so that the random prospect is proportional to the agent’s wealth and
the agent’s utility function displays contant relative risk aversion rather than constant absolute risk
aversion. In that case a small gamble consisting of a 0.35% gain vs. a 0.30% loss corresponds to a
large gamble with expectation of 9.6% and standard deviation of 6.8%. This example is qualitatively
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similar to that given in the text. Details are available from the author.
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